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Price discrimination is one of the most prevalent forms of marketing practices. One
may occasionally doubt whether firms really engage in some of the kinds of sophisticated
strategic reasoning economists are fond of examining, but there can be no doubt that firms
are well aware of the benefits of price discrimination.
Consider, for example, the following passage taken from a brochure published by the
Boston Consulting Group:
"A key step is to avoid average pricing. Pricing to specific customer groups
should reflect the true competitive value of what is being provided. When this is
achieved, no money is left on the table unnecessarily on the one hand, while no
opportunities are opened for competitors through inadvertent overpricing on the
other. Pricing is an accurate and confident action that takes full advantage of the
combination of customers' price sensitivity and alternative suppliers they have or
could have." Miles (1986)
Although an economist might have used somewhat more technical terminology, the
central ideas of price discrimination are quite apparent in this passage.
Every undergraduate microeconomics textbook contains a list of examples of price dis-
crimination; the most popular illustrations seem to be those of student discounts, Senior
Citizen's discounts, and the like. Given the prevalence of price discrimination as an eco-
nomic phenomenon, it is surprisingly difficult to come up with an entirely satisfactory
definition.
The conventional definition is that price discrimination is present when the same com-
modity is sold at different prices to different consumers. However, this definition fails on
two counts: different prices charged to different consumers could simply reflect transporta-
tion costs, or similar costs of selling the good; and price discrimination could be present
even when all consumers are charged the same price-consider the case of a uniform de-
livered price.1
We prefer Stigler's (1987) definition: price discrimination is present when two or more
similar goods are sold at prices that are in different ratios to marginal costs. As an
illustration, Stigler uses the example of a book that sells in hard cover for $15 and in
paperback for $5. Here, he argues, there is a presumption of discrimination, since the
binding costs are not sufficient to explain the difference in price. Of course, this definition
still leaves open the precise meaning of "similar," but the definition will be useful for our
purposes.
Three conditions are necessary in order for price discrimination to be a viable solution
to a firm's pricing problem. First, the firm must have some market power. Second, the
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generous comments, suggestions and corrections for which I am very grateful.
1 For further discussion, see Phlips (1983), pp. 5-7.
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firm must have the ability to sort consumers. And third, the firm must be able to prevent
resale. We will briefly discuss each of these points, and develop them in much greater
detail in the course of the paper.
We turn first to the issue of market power. Price discrimination arises naturally in
the theory of monopoly and oligopoly. Whenever a good is sold at a price in excess of its
marginal cost, there is an incentive to engage in price discrimination. For to say that price
is in excess of marginal cost is to say that there is someone who is willing to pay more than
the cost of production for an extra unit of the good. Lowering the price to all consumers
may well be unprofitable, but lowering the price to the marginal consumer alone will likely
be profitable.
In order to lower the price only to the marginal consumer, or more generally to some
specific class of consumers, the firm must have a way to sort consumers. The easiest case is
where the firm can explicitly sort consumers with respect to some exogenous category such
as age. A more complex analysis is necessary when the firm must price discriminate on the
basis of some endogenous category such as time of purchase. In this case the monopolist
faces the problem of structuring his pricing so that consumers "self select" into appropriate
categories.
Finally, if the firm is to sell at different prices to different consumers, the firm must
have a way to prevent consumers who purchase at a discount price from reselling to other
consumers. Carlton and Perloff (forthcoming) discuss several mechanisms that can be used
to prevent resale:
* Some goods such as services, electric power, etc. are difficult to resell because of the
nature of the good.
" Tariffs, taxes and transportation costs can impose barriers to resale. For example, it is
common for publishers to sell books at different prices in different countries and rely
on transportation costs or tariffs to restrict resale.
* A firm may legally restrict resale. For example, computer manufacturers often offer
educational discounts along with a contractual provision that restricts resale.
" A firm can modify its product. For example, some firms sell student editions of software
that has more limited capabilities than the standard versions.
The economic analyst is, of course, interested in having a detailed and accurate model
of the firm's behavior. But in addition, the economist wants to be able to pass judgment on
that behavior. To what degree does price discrimination of various types promote economic
welfare? What types of discrimination should be encouraged and what types discouraged?
Price discrimination is illegal only insofar as it "substantially lessens competition." How
are we to interpret this phrase? These are some of the issues we will examine in this survey.
Theory
1. Types of Price Discrimination
The traditional classification of the forms of price discrimination is due to Pigou (1920).
First-degree, or perfect price discrimination involves the seller charging a different price
for each unit of the good in such a way that the price charged for each unit is equal to
the maximum willingness to pay for that unit.
2
Second-degree price discrimination, or nonlinear pricing, occurs when prices differ de-
pending on the number of units of the good bought, but not across consumers. That is,
each consumer faces the same price schedule, but the schedule involves different prices
for different amounts of the good purchased. Quantity discounts or premia are the
obvious examples.
Third-degree price discrimination means that different purchasers are charged different
prices, but each purchaser pays a constant amount for each unit of the good bought.
This is perhaps the most common form of price discrimination; examples are student
discounts, or charging different prices on different days of the week.
We will follow Pigou's classification in this survey, discussing the forms of price dis-
crimination in the order in which he suggested them. Subsequently, we will take up some
more specialized topics that do not seem to fit conveniently in this classification scheme.
We have had the benefit of a number of other surveys of the topic of price discrimination
and have not hesitated to draw heavily from those works. Some of these works are published
and some are not, and it seems appropriate to briefly survey the surveys before launching
in to our own.
First, we must mention Phlips' (1983) extensive book, The Economics of Price Dis-
crimination, which contains a broad survey of the area and many intriguing examples.
Next, we have found Tirole's (forthcoming) chapter on price discrimination to be very use-
ful, especially in its description of issues involving nonlinear pricing. Robert Wilson's class
notes (1985) provided us with an extensive bibliography and discussion of many aspects
of product marketing, of which price discrimination is only a part. Finally, Carlton and
Perloff (forthcoming) give a very nice overview of the issues and a detailed treatment of
several interesting sub-topics. We are especially grateful to these authors for providing us
with their unpublished work.
2. First-degree Price Discrimination
First-degree price discrimination, or perfect price discrimination, means that the seller sells
each unit of the good at the maximum price that anyone is willing to pay for that unit
of the good. Alternatively, perfect price discrimination is sometimes defined as occurring
when the seller makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer to each consumer that extracts the
maximum amount possible from the market.
Although the equivalence of these two definitions has been long asserted-Pigou men-
tions it in his discussion of first-degree price discrimination-it is not entirely clear just
how generally the two definitions coincide. Is the equivalence true only in the case of
quasilinear utility, or does it hold true more generally? As it turns out, the proposition is
valid in quite general circumstances.
To see this, consider a simple model with two goods, x and y and a single consumer.
We choose y as the numeraire good, and normalize its price to one. (Think of the y-good
as being money.) The consumer is initially consuming 0 units of the x-good, and the
monopolist wishes to sell x* units for the largest possible amount of the y-good. Let y*
be the amount of the y-good that the consumer has after making this payment; then y* is
the solution to the equation
u*,y)= u(0, y), (1)
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and the payment is simply y - y*. This is clearly the largest possible amount of the y-
good that the consumer would pay on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to consume x* units of the
x-good.
Suppose instead that the monopolist breaks up x* into n pieces of size Ax and sells
each piece to the consumer at the maximum price the consumer would be willing to pay for
that piece. Let (xi, y;) be the amount the consumer has at the in stage of this process, so
that thus yi_1 - y; is the amount paid for the it1 unit of the x-good. Since utility remains
constant during this process we have
u(xi, y1) - u(0, y) = 0
u(x2, y 2 ) - u(x, y1) = 0
(2)
u(X*, yn) - u(za-1, yn-1) = 0
We want to show that y., the total amount held of the y-good after this process is com-
pleted, is equal to y*, the amount paid by the take-it-or-leave-it offer described above.
But this is easy; just add up the equations in (2) to find
u(x*,yn) - u(0, y) = 0.
Examining (1) we see that y, = y*, as was to be shown.
Welfare and Output Effects
It is well known that a perfectly discriminating monopolist produces a Pareto efficient
amount of output, but a formal proof of this proposition may be instructive. Let u(x, y)
be the utility function of the consumer, as before, and for simplicity suppose that the
monopolist cares only about his consumption of the y-good. (Again, it is convenient to
think of the y-good as being money.) The monopolist is endowed with a technology that
allows him to produce x units of the x-good by using c(x) units of the y-good. The initial
endowment of the consumer is denoted by (xe, ye), and by assumption the monopolist has
an initial endowment of zero of each good.
The monopolist wants to choose a (positive) production level r and a (negative) pay-
ment y of the y-good that maximizes his utility subject to the constraint that the consumer
actually purchases the x-good from the monopolist. Thus the maximization problem be-
comes
max y - c(x)
s.t. u(xc +X, yc + y) U(Xe, yc).
But this problem simply asks us to find a feasible allocation that maximizes the utility of
one party, the monopolist, subject to the constraint that the other party, the consumer,
has some given level of utility. This is the definition of a Pareto efficient allocation. Hence,
a perfectly discriminating monopolist will choose a Pareto efficient level of output.
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By the Second Welfare Theorem, and the appropriate convexity conditions, this Pareto
efficient level of output is a competitive equilibrium for some endowments. In order to see
this directly, denote the solution to the monopolist's maximization problem by (x*, y*).
This solution must satisfy the first-order conditions
+ u(xc + x*, y c+y*).
ay
,(x + u(xc+x*,yc+y*-C (x) -Ax=0. (3)
Dividing the second equation by the first and rearranging give us
Bu(xc + x*, ye + y*)/8ax =,1 ,*
Bu(xc + x*, ye + y* )/ay
If the consumer has an endowment of (xc + x*, yc + y*) and the firm faces a parametric
price set at
Ou(xc +x*,yc + y*)/Ox
9u(xC + X*, yc + y*)/y
the firm's profit maximization problem will take the form
max p*x - c(x).x
In this case it is clear that the firm will optimally choose to produce x* units of output,
as required.
Of course, the proof that the output level of a perfectly discriminating monopolist is
the same as that of a competitive firm only holds if the appropriate reassignment of initial
endowments is made. However, if we are willing to rule out income effects, this caveat can
be eliminated.
To see this, let us now assume that the utility function for the consumer takes the




This shows that the Pareto efficient level of output produced by the perfectly discriminating
monopolist is independent of the endowment of y, which is what we require. Clearly the
amount of the x-good produced is the same as that of a competitive firm that faces a
parametric price given by p* = Ou(xc + x*)/Ox.
Prevalence of First-degree Price Discrimination
Take-it-or-leave-it offers are not terribly common forms of negotiation for two reasons.
First, the "leave-it" threat lacks credibility: typically a seller has no way to commit to
breaking off negotiations if an offer is rejected. And once an initial offer has been rejected,
it is generally rational for the seller to continue to bargain.
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Second, even if the seller had a way to commit to ending negotiations, he typically
lacks full information about the buyers' preferences. Thus the seller cannot determine for
certain whether his offer will actually be accepted, and must trade off the costs of rejection
with the benefits of additional profits.
If the seller was able to precommit to take-it-or-leave-it, and he had perfect information
about buyers' preferences, one would expect to see transactions made according to this
mechanism. After all, it does afford the seller the most possible profits.
However, vestiges of the attempt to first-degree price discriminate can still be detected
in some marketing arrangements. Some kinds of goods - ranging from aircraft on the one
hand to refrigerators and stereos on the other - are still sold by haggling. Certainly this
must be due to an attempt to price discriminate among prospective customers.
To the extent that such haggling is successful in extracting the full surplus from con-
sumers, it tends to encourage the production of an efficient amount of output. But of course
the haggling itself incurs costs. A full welfare analysis of attempts to engage in this kind
of price discrimination cannot neglect the transactions costs involved in the negotiation
itself.
Two-part Tariffs
Two-part tariffs are pricing schemes that involve a fixed fee which must be paid to consume
any amount of the good, and then a variable fee based on usage. The classic example is
pricing an amusement park: one price must be paid to enter the park, and then further
fees must be paid for each of the rides. Other examples include products such as cameras
and film, or telephone service which requires a fixed monthly fee plus an additional charge
based on usage.
The classic exposition of two-part tariffs in a profit maximization setting is Oi (1971). A
more extended treatment may be found in Ng and Weisser (1974) and Schmalensee (1981).
Two-part tariffs have also been applied to problems of social welfare maximization by
Feldstein (1972), Littlechild (1975), Leland and Meyer (1976), and Auerbach and Pellechio
(1978). In this survey we will focus on the profit maximization problem.
Let the indirect utility function of a consumer of type t facing a price p and having
income y be denoted by v(p, t) + y. If the price of the good is so high that the consumer
does not choose to consume it, let v(p, t) = 0. The prices of all other goods are assumed to
be constant. Note that we have built in the assumption that preferences are quasilinear;
i.e., that there are no income effects. This allows for the cleanest analysis of the problem.2
Let x(p, t) be the demand for the good by a consumer of type t when the price is p.
By Roy's identity, x(p, t) = -Ov(p, t)/Op. Suppose that the good can be produced at a
constant marginal cost of c per unit.
2 The literature on two-part tariffs seems a bit confused about this point; some authors explicitly examine
cases involving income effects, but then use consumer's surplus as a welfare measure. Since consumer's
surplus is an exact measure of welfare only in the case where income effects are absent, this procedure is
a dubious practice at best.
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Initially, we consider the situation where all consumers are the same type. If the firm
charges an entrance fee e, the consumer will choose to enter if
v(p, t)+ y - e y,
so that the maximum entrance fee the park can charge is
e = v(p,t).
The profit maximization problem is then
max e + (p - c)x(p, t)
s.t. e = v(p, t).
Incorporating the constraint into the objective function and differentiating with respect to
p yields
8v(p, t) 8x(p, t)
P + (P - C) O + x(p, t) = 0.
Substituting from Roy's identity yields
-x(p,) + (p - c) xt)+ x(p, t) = 0,




It follows that if all the consumers are the same type, the profit maximizing policy is to
set price equal to marginal cost and set an entrance fee that extracts all of the consumers'
surplus. That is, the optimal policy is to engage in first-degree price discrimination. This
is, of course, a Pareto efficient pricing scheme.
Things become more interesting when there is a distribution of types. Let F(t) de-
note the cumulative distribution function and f(t) the density of types. Suppose that
av(p, t)/8t < 0, so that the value of the good is decreasing in t. Then if the firm charges
an entrance fee e and a price p, a consumer of type t will choose to enter if
v(p, t) + y - e y.
Thus for each p there will be a marginal consumer T such that
e == v(p, T).
Given p, the monopolist's choice of an entrance fee is equivalent to the choice of the
marginal consumer T. For any T we can denote the aggregate demand of the admitted
consumers as
X(p, T) =] x(p, t)f(t) dt.
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Note carefully the notational distinction between the demand of the admitted consumers
X(p, T) and the demand of the marginal consumer x(p, T).
The profit maximization problem of the monopolist is
max v(p, T)F(T) + (p - c)X(p, T),
which has first-order conditions
B -F(T) +v(P, T)F'(T) +X(p,- )=0.
Using Roy's identity and the fact that F'(T) = f(T), these conditions become
OX
-x(p, T)F(T) + (p - c)-- + X(p, T) = 0 (4)
OpX
SF(T) + v(p, T)f(T) + (p - c) a = 0. (5)
Multiply and divide the middle term of the first equation by X/p to find
-x(p, T)F(T) + X(p, T)p - C aU(P + X(p,T) = 0. (6)
p Op X
Let e denote the elasticity of aggregate demand of the admitted consumers so that
8X(p,T) p
E Op X(p,T)j
Using this notation, we can manipulate (6) to find
p - c x(p,T)
le| = 1 - . (7)
p X(p,T)/F(T)
Expression (7) tells us quite a bit about two-part tariffs. First, note that the expression
is a simple transformation of the ordinary monopoly pricing rule,
p-c
When a two-part tariff is possible, the right-hand side is adjusted down by a term which
can be interpreted as a ratio of the demand of the marginal consumer to the demand of the
average admitted consumer. When the marginal consumer has the same demand as the
average consumer-as in the case where all consumers are identical--the optimal two-part
tariff involves setting price equal to marginal cost, as we established earlier.
8
We would normally expect that the marginal consumer would demand less than the
average consumer; in this case, the price charged in the two-part tariff would be greater
than marginal cost. However, it is possible that the marginal consumer would demand more
than the average consumer. Imagine a situation where the marginal consumer doesn't value
the good very highly, but wants to consume a larger than average amount; i.e., v(p, T) is
small, but |Ov(p, T)/Op| is large. In this case, the optimal price in the two-part tariff would
be less than marginal cost, but the monopolist makes up for it through the entrance fees.
(This is an example of the famous auto salesman claim - where the firm loses money on
every sale but makes up for it in volume - due to the entrance fee!)
For more on the analytics of two-part tariffs, see the definitive treatment by Schmalensee
(1981). Schmalensee points out that two-part tariffs are essentially a pricing problem in-
volving two especially complementary goods - entrance to the amusement park and the
rides themselves. Viewed from this perspective it is easy to see why one of the goods may be
sold below marginal cost, or why p is typically less than the monopoly price. Schmalensee
also considers much more general technologies and analyzes several important subcases
such as the case where the customers are downstream firms.
Welfare Effects of the Two-part Tariff
We have already indicated that a two-part tariff with identical consumers leads to a full
welfare optimum. What happens with non-identical consumers?
Welfare is given by consumers' surplus plus profits:
1TW(p, T) = v(p, i)f(t) dt +(p -c)X(p, T).
Differentiating with respect to p and T and using Roy's identity, yields
B9W(pT T=- x(p, t)f(t) di + (p - c) - + X(p,T)
Op Jo Op
OW(p, T )
______' = [v(p, T) + (p - c)x(p, T)]f(T).
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Evaluating these derivatives at the profit maximizing two-part tariff (p*, T*) given in (4)
and (5) we have
W(p )= (p* - c)X= x(p*,T*)F(T*) - X(p*,T*)
Op =p
OW(p*,T*) _Ov(p*, T*)F(*,>0
The first equation will be positive or negative as the demand of the marginal consumer
is greater or less than the demand of the average consumer. If all consumers have the
same tastes, the marginal consumer and the average consumer coincide so that price will
be equal to marginal cost and therefore optimal from a social viewpoint. Normally, we
would expect the marginal consumer to have a lower demand than the average consumer,
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which implies that price is greater than marginal cost. Hence, it is too high from a social
viewpoint, and welfare would increase by lowering it. However, as we have seen above, if
the marginal consumer has a higher demand than the average consumer, price will be set
below marginal cost, which implies that the monopolist under prices his output.
The second equation shows that the monopolist always serves too small a market, since
Ov/OT < 0 and F(T) > 0 by assumption. This holds regardless of whether price is greater
or less than marginal cost.
Although the primary focus of this essay is on the profit maximizing case, we can briefly
explore the welfare maximization problem. Setting the derivatives of welfare equal to zero
and rearranging, we have
OW(p, T) aX
=P(P-c) - 0
T = [v(p, T) + (p - c)x(p, T)]f(T) = 0.
The first equation requires that price be equal to marginal cost; using this fact the
second equation can be rewritten as
OW(p, T)
OT =v(p, T)f(T) =0.
This equation implies that consumers be admitted until the marginal valuation is reduced
to zero (or as low as it can go and remain nonnegative.) This simply says that anyone
who is willing to purchase the good at marginal cost should be allowed to do so, hardly a
surprising result.
A more interesting expression results if we require that the firm must cover some fixed
costs of providing the good. This adds a constraint to the problem of the form
v(p, T)F(T) + (p - c)X(p,T) = K,
where K is the fixed cost that must be covered. The first term on the left-hand side is the
total entrance fees collected, and the second term is the profit earned on the sales of the
good.
Here it is natural to take the objective function as being the consumers' welfare alone,
rather than the consumers' plus the producer's surplus. This leads to a maximization
problem of the form
max Jc v(p,t )f(t) dt - v(p, T)F(T)
s.t. v(p, T)F(T) +(p - c)X(p,T) = K.
The first-order conditions for this problem are
aX
-X(p,T) + x(p, T)F(T ) - A[-x(p, T)F(T) +(p - c)-~. + X(p, T)] =0
Ovp
8T {T - LOFT )+v(p,T jf(T) )+(p - c)x(p,T jf(T )] =0.
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It is of interest to ask when the constrained maximization problem involves setting price
equal to marginal cost. Rearranging the first equation, we have
(1-+ A)[x(p, T)F(T) - X(p, T)] = A(p -c) .
From this expression it is easy to see that if price equals marginal cost we must have either
x(p, T) - X(p, T)
F(T)
which means that the average demand equals the marginal demand, or
A =-1.
We have encountered the first condition several times already, and it needs no further
discussion. Turning to the second condition, we note that if A = -1, the second first-order
condition implies that v(p, T) = 0, i.e., that the entrance fee is zero. This can only happen
when the fixed costs are zero, so we conclude that essentially the only case in which price
will be equal to marginal cost is when the average demand and the marginal demand
coincide.
Pareto Improving Two-part Tariffs
Robert Willig (1978) has observed that there will typically exist a pricing scheme involv-
ing two-part tariffs that Pareto dominate nondiscriminatory monopoly pricing. This is a
much stronger result than the welfare domination discussed above: Willig shows that all
consumers and the producer are at least as well off with a particular pricing scheme than
with flat rate pricing.
To illustrate the Willig result in its simplest case, suppose that there are two consumers
with demand functions D 1 (p) and D2 (p) with D2 (p) > D 1 (p) for all p. For simplicity we
take costs to be zero. Let pf be any price in excess of marginal cost, c. In order to
construct the Pareto dominating two-part tariff, choose pt to be any price between pf and
c and choose the lump sum entry fee e to satisfy
e = (pf - pt)D2(pf1).
Now consider a pricing scheme where all consumers are offered the choice between pur-
chasing at the flat rate pf or choosing the two-part tariff. If neither consumer chooses the
two-part tariff, the situation is unchanged and uninteresting. If consumer 2 chooses the
two-part tariff, then it must make him better off. The revenue received by the firm from
consumer 2 will be
pf- pt )D2(pf) + ptD2(pt ) = pfD92(pf ) + pt(D2 (pt ) - D2 (pj )) > pf D2(pf ).
The inequality follows from the fact that demand curves slope down and pt < pf. Hence
revenue from consumer 2 has increased, so the firm is bet ter off. We only have to examine
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the case of consumer 1. If consumer 1 stays with the flat rate, we are done. Otherwise,
consumer 1 chooses the two-part tariff and the revenue received from him will be
(Pi - pt)D 2(pf) + ptD 1(pt) (p. - pt)D1(pf)-+ pt D,(pt)
= pf Di(pf) + pt(DiA(pt) - D1(pg ))
pfD1(pf).
The first inequality follows from the assumption that D2 (pf) > DI(pf) and the second
from the fact that demand curves slope down. The conclusion is that the firm makes at
least as much from consumer 1 under the two-part tariff as under the flat rate. Hence,
offering the choice between the two pricing systems yields a Pareto improvement. As long
as consumer 2 strictly prefers the two-part tariff - the likely case - this will be a strict
Pareto improvement.
Of course this argument only shows that it is possible for a flat rate plus a two-part
tariff to Pareto dominate a pure flat rate scheme. It does not imply that moving from
flat rates to such a scheme will necessarily result in a Pareto improvement, since a profit
maximizing firm will not necessarily choose the correct two-part tariff. Thus the result is
more appropriate in the context of public utility pricing rather than profit maximization.
3. Second-degree Price Discrimination
Second-degree price discrimination, or nonlinear price discrimination, occurs when indi-
viduals face nonlinear price schedules; i.e., the price paid depends on the quantity bought.
The paradigm case of this form of price discrimination is quantity discounts.
Curiously, the determination of optimal nonlinear prices was not carefully examined
until Spence (1976). Since then there have been a number of contributions in this area;
see the literature survey in Brown and Sibley (1986). Much of this work uses techniques
originally developed by Mirrlees (1971), (1976), Roberts (1979) and others for the purpose
of analyzing problems in optimal taxation. Much of the work described by Brown and
Sibley is motivated by public utility pricing. Here the appropriate objective is welfare
maximization rather than profit maximization. Since this literature is already discussed in
another contribution to this volume, we will focus only on the profit maximization problem.
Our treatment follows the excellent discussion in Tirole (forthcoming) which in turn
is based on Maskin and Riley (1984). However, we conduct the main derivation using a
general utility structure and resort to the special case considered by these authors only
when needed.
Two Types of Consumers
It is useful to begin by considering a situation where there are only two types of consumers,
a fraction fi of type ti and a fraction f2 of type t2. The monopolist wants to sell z1 to
the type 1 consumers and amount X2 to the type 2 consumers, collecting total payments
of r1 and r2 from each type.
The utility functions of the consumers are of the quasilinear form u(x,, t2) + y; where
y, is the consumption of the numeraire good. For convenience, we take the endowment
of the numneraire good to be zero. We also assume that u(x, t2) > u(x, ti) and that
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au(x, t2 )/Ox > Ou(x, ti )/Ox. These assumptions imply that not only is consumer 2 willing
to pay more than consumer 1 for a given amount of the good, but also that consumer
2's marginal willingness-to-pay exceeds consumer l's. We will refer to consumer 2 as the
high-demand consumer and consumer 1 as the low-demand consumer. The assumptions
imply that the demand function for the high-demand consumer is always greater than
the demand function for the low-demand consumer, a property sometimes known as the
non-crossing condition.
The demand constraints facing the monopolist are as follows. First, each consumer
must want to consume the amount xi and be willing to pay the price ri:
u(xi, ti) - ri 0
u(x2 , t2) - r2 > 0.
This is simply defining the domain of the problem we will analyze. Second, each consumer
must prefer his consumption to the consumption of the other consumer.
u(xi, t 1) - r1  u(x 2 ,ti)-r 2
u(x 2, t2 ) - r2 u(xi,t 2 )-ri.
These are the so-called self-selection constraints. If the plan (xi, x2 ) is to be feasible in
the sense that it will be voluntarily chosen by the consumers, then each consumer must
prefer consuming the bundle intended for him as compared to consuming the other person's
bundle.
Our assumptions about the utility functions and the fact that the monopolist wants
the prices to be as high as possible imply that two of the above four inequalities will be
binding constraints. Specifically the low-demand consumer will be charged his maximum
willingness-to-pay, and the high-demand consumer will be charged the highest price that
will just induce him to consume x2 rather than x 1. Solving for r 1 and r2 gives
r1 = u(xi, t1)
and
r2 = u(x2 ,t 2 ) - u(xi,t2 ) + u(xi, ti).
The profit function of the monopolist is
7r = [r1 - cx1]fi + [r2 - cx2 ]f 2 ,
which upon substitution for r1 and r2 becomes
7= [u(x1 , t1) - cx1]fi + [u(x2, t2) - u(x1 , t2) + u( 1i, t1) - cx2 ]f 2 -
This expression is to be maximized with respect to x1 and x2 . Differentiating, we have
r[Ou(x1, ti) _B i+[u(x1, ti) B u(xi, t2)1 _(8
I fi_ + -jf 2 -=O 8
Bu(x2 ,t 2 )___.(9
8x2
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Equation (8) can be rearranged to give
Bu(zi, t1) _ Bu(x1, t2) au(x1, ti) f2 (0[ J+ '(10)82 x1 Bx i fi '
which means that the low-demand consumer has a (marginal) value for the good that
exceeds marginal cost. Hence he consumes an inefficiently small amount of the good.
Equation (9) says that at the optimal nonlinear prices, the high-demand consumer has a
marginal willingness-to-pay which is equal to marginal cost. Thus he consumes the socially
correct amount.
The result that the consumer with the highest demand pays marginal cost is very gen-
eral. If the consumer with the highest demand pays a price in excess of marginal cost, the
monopolist could lower the price charged to the largest consumer by a small amount, induc-
ing him to buy more. Since price still exceeds marginal cost, the monopolist would make
a profit on these sales. Furthermore, such a policy wouldn't affect the monopolist's profits
from any other consumers, since they are all optimized at lower values of consumption.
In order to get more explicit results about the optimal pricing scheme, it is necessary to
make more explicit assumptions about tastes. For example, it is common to observe price
discounts in certain types of goods - high-demand consumers pay a lower per-unit cost
than low-demand consumers. Maskin and Riley (1984) show that if preferences take the
specific form u(x, t) + y = tv(x) + y, then the optimal pricing policy will exhibit quantity
discounts in this sense.
A Continuum of Types
Suppose now that there are a continuum of types, and let f(t) be the density of consumers
of type t. For convenience, let the types range from 0 to T. Let the utility function of a
consumer of type t be given by u(x, t) + y, and let r(x) be the revenue collected from a
consumer who chooses to consume x units of the good. Again, we assume that increasing









Let x(t) be the optimal consumption of a consumer of type t when facing a revenue
function r(.). The self-selection constraints imply that a consumer of type t prefers his
consumption to a consumer of type s which means
u(x(t), t) - r(x(t)) ;> u(x(s), t) - r(z(s)).
Consider the function g(s) defined by
g(s) = [u(x(t), t) - r(z(t))] - [u(z(s), t) - r(z(s))].
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We have just seen that g(s) > 0 and of course g(t) = 0. It follows that g(s) reaches its
maximum value when s = t. Hence, the derivative of g with respect to a must vanish at
s = t, which implies
(Ou(x(tt)) _ Or(x(t)) dx(t)_
ax ax } ds 0
which in turn implies that
Ou(x(t), t) _BOr(x(t))
Ox Ox
This is the analog of the self-selection constraint given above.3
Let V(t) be the maximized utility of an agent of type t when facing a pricing schedule
r(-). That is,
V(t) . u(x(t), t) - r(x(t)). (12)
We will have occasion to use the derivative of V(t). Using (11) we calculate
V'(t) -- lu(x(t), t) _Br(x(t)) dx Ou(x(t), t)
8x 8x / dt+ &
Ou(x(t), t)
Ot'
This is simply the envelope theorem - the total derivative of utility reduces to the partial
derivative after substituting in the first-order conditions for maximization.
The monopolist wants to choose x(t) so as to maximize profits subject to the self-
selection constraints. Profits are given by
T
r = j[r(x(t)) -ex(t)]f(t) dt.
The trick is to build the self-selection constraints into the objective function in a useful
way. Using (12) we can rewrite profits as
T' T
= j[u(x(t), t) - cx(t)]f(t) dt - j V(t)f(t) dt. (13)
Integrating the last term by parts, we have
V(t )f(t) dt = V(t)(F(t) - 1)' - V'(t)[F(t) - 1]dt.
(Here we have used F(t) -1 as the integral of f(t).) The utility of type 0 is normalized to
be 0, and F(T) = 1; hence the first term on the right-hand side of this expression vanishes.
Substituting from (12) leaves us with
fTV(t)f(t)dti= - f'ux~) [F(t) - ]dt.
3The self-selection constraint can also be thought of as a no-envy constraint. The calculation given
here was first used in examining envy-free allocations in Varian (1978).
15
Substituting this back into the objective function, equation (13), gives us the final form of
the profit function
7r= T 4[u(x(t), t) - cx(t)]f(t) - U(X(t), t)1- F(t)]dt.
Along the optimal path, the derivative of the integrand with respect to each x(t) should
vanish. This gives us the first-order condition
[au(x(t),t) _21- xt), _)
xIa -CJ f(t) - [1 - F(t)] = 0.
Solving for Ou/&x yields
Ou(x(t), t)__ 82 u(x(t), t) 1- F(t)
a = c+ .OX [f t J'(14)
It is instructive to compare this expression to the formula for the optimal marginal price
in the case of two consumers given in (10). Note the close analogy. As in the case with two
consumers, all consumers pay a price in excess of marginal cost except for the consumer
with the highest willingness-to-pay, consumer T.
In order to derive further results about the shape of the optimal policy, it is necessary
to make more detailed assumptions about preferences and the distribution of tastes. For
example, suppose that we adopt the form of preferences used by Maskin and Riley (1984),
tv(x) + y. Let p(x) = r'(x) be the marginal price when purchases are x. Equation (11)
then implies that r'(x(t)) = tv'(x(t)) is the optimal solution. Substituting this into (14)
and rearranging yields
p(x(t)) - c _ 1- F(t)
p(x(t)) tf(t)
The expression (1 - F(t))/f(t) is known as the hazard rate. For a wide variety of distri-
butions, including the uniform, the normal, and the exponential, the hazard rate increases
with t. Assuming this, and using the concavity of v(x), it is not hard to show that x(t)
increases with t and the marginal price p(x(t)) decreases with x(t). Thus this form of
preference leads to quantity discounts, a result first proved by Maskin and Riley (1984).
The reader should be warned that our derivation of the profit maximizing nonlinear
price was rather cavalier. We assumed differentiability as needed as well as assuming that
various second order conditions would be satisfied. Unfortunately, these assumptions are
not innocuous. Optimal pricing policies can easily exhibit kinks so that consumers of
different types end up bunching at comrnon quantities, or gaps, so that some consumer
types end up not being served. For a detailed and lucid taxonomy of what can go wrong,
as well as some illustrative examples, see the discussion in Brown and Sibley (1986), pages
208-215.
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Welfare and Output Effects
Katz (1983) has examined the welfare and output effects of nonlinear pricing. He shows
that in general the monopolist may produce too little or too much output as compared
with the social optimum, but when the non-crossing condition is satisfied, the monopolist
will typically restrict total output. In general, total welfare will be positively associated
with total output so that changes in output may serve as appropriate indicators for changes
in welfare.
4. Third-degree Price Discrimination
Third-degree price discrimination occurs when consumers are charged different prices but
each consumer faces a constant price for all units of output purchased. This is probably
the most common form of price discrimination.
The textbook case is where there are two separate markets, where the firm can easily
enforce the division. An example would be discrimination by age, such as youth discounts
at the movies. If we let pi(Xi) be the inverse demand function for group i, and suppose
that there are two groups, then the monopolist's profit maximization problem is
max p 1(x1)x1 +p 2 (x 2 )x 2 -Ccx 1 - cx2.
X1,22
The first-order conditions for this problem are
pi(xi) + p'(xi)x 1 = c
P2(x2) +p'2(x 2 )x2 = c.
Let e= be the elasticity of demand in market i, we can write these expressions as
p1(zi) 1-- - =C
p2(x2) I1 - i-1.] c.
It follows that pi(x1) > p2 (x2 ) if and only if Iei I < 1e2|. Hence the market with the more
elastic demand-the market that is more price sensitive-is charged the lower price.
Suppose now that the monopolist is unable to separate the markets as cleanly as as-
sumed, so that the price charged in one market influences the demand in another market.
For example, consider a theater that has a bargain night on Monday; the lower price on
Monday would presumably influence demand on Tuesday to some degree.
In this case the profit maximization problem of the firm is
max p1(x1 ,xz2)xi +p2(xi, x2)x 2 -cX1 - CX2,
and the first-order conditions become
pi+ - 1 + z 2 = cOx1  Ozi
P2 + -- X 2 + -X1 = C.Ox2 Ox2
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We can rearrange these conditions to give
p1[1- 1/k1l + 2 =C
ax1
P2[1 - 1/|62|]1 + 8 Pi, -= C.
It is not easy to say anything very interesting about these equations, but we will try.
One simplification we can make is to assume there are no income effects so that
&p1 /ax2 = OP2 /8x1 ; i.e., the cross price effects are symmetric.4 Subtracting the second
equation from the first and rearranging, we have
Pi 1 - -1 -P2 [i-1 - [x-X2] -L |e1|J L E2|J 8x 1
It is natural to suppose that the two goods are substitutes - after all they are the same
good being sold to different groups - so that 0p2 /8x 1 > 0. Without loss of generality,
assume that x 1 > x2 , which, by the equation immediately above, implies that
pi 1 -P2 1- > 0.[ 1 r 1|11 IEil I -|2L1 2|
Rearranging, we have
Pi 1 - 1/e 21
P2 1-1/|1|.
It follows from this expression that if |2|I > l ei we must have pi > P2. That is, if
the smaller market has the more elastic demand, it must have the lower price. Thus
the intuition of the separate markets carries over to the more general case under these
additional assumptions.
Welfare Effects
Much of the discussion about third-degree price discrimination has to do with the welfare
effects of allowing this form of price discrimination. Would we generally expect consumer
plus producer surplus to be higher or lower when third-degree price discrimination is
present than when it is not?
Since Robinson (1933) first raised this question, it has been the subject of a number of
investigations including Battalio and Ekelund (1972), Holahan (1975), Hsu (1983), Ippolito
(1980), Kwoka (1984), Yamey (1974), Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1986), Schmalensee
(1981), and Varian (1988). Varian's results are the most general and serve as the focus of
our discussion.
4 Actually assuming no income effects is a stronger assumption than we need. Willig (1976) and Variani
(1978) have shown that all that is necessary is that the income elasticities of goods 1 and 2 are locally
constant over some region in price-income space.
18
We begin with formulating a general test for welfare improvement. Suppose for sim-
plicity that there are only two groups and start with an aggregate utility function of the
form u(x1, x2 ) + y. Here x1 and x2 are the consumptions of the two groups and y is money
to be spent on other consumption goods. The inverse demand functions for the two goods
are given by




p2 (x 1 , x2 ) = , -8x 2
We assume that u(xi, x2) is concave and differentiable, though this is slightly stronger
than needed.
Let c(xi, x2 ) be the cost of providing x 1 and x2 , so that social welfare is measured by
W(x 1 ,x 2 ) = u(x1, x 2 ) - c(x 1, x 2 ).
Now consider two configurations of output, (xi, x2) and (xi, xZ), with associated prices
(p°, p2) and (p'1, p'2). By the concavity of u(x1, x2 ), we have
au(xl x2) , 0 Bu(x° x2) ,
u(x'i, z2) < u(zi,)z2) + (x1 - xi) + (x2 - x2).
Rearranging and using the definition of the inverse demand functions we have
Au _<pAxi + p°Ax2 .
By an analogous argument we have
Au p1Ax1 + p2Ax2.
Since AW = Au - Ac, we have our final result
p°Axi + p°Ax2 - Ac > AW p'1Ax1 +p'2 Ax2 - Ac. (15)
In the special case of constant marginal cost, Ac = cAx1 +cAx2, so the inequality becomes
(pi - c)Ax1 + (p2 - c)Ax2  AW (p' - c)Ax1 + (p'2 - c)Ax2. (16)
Note that these welfare bounds are perfectly general, based only on the concavity of
the utility function, which is, in turn, basically the requirement that demand curves slope
down. Varian (1985) derived the inequalities using the indirect utility function, which is
slightly more general.
In order to apply these inequalities to the question of price discrimination, let the initial
set of prices be the constant monopoly prices so that p0 - p0 = p0, and let (p'1,p'2) be the
discriminatory prices. Then the bounds in (16) become







Figure 1. Illustration of the welfare bounds.
The upper bound implies that a necessary condition for welfare to increase is that total
output increase. Suppose to the contrary that total output decreased so that Ax 1 + Ax 2 <
0. Since p0 -c> 0, (17) implies that AW < 0. The lower bound gives a sufficient condition
for welfare to increase under price discrimination, namely that the sum of the weighted
output changes is positive, with the weights being given by price minus marginal cost.
The simple geometry of the bounds is shown in Figure 1. The welfare gain AW is the
indicated trapezoid. The area of this trapezoid is clearly bounded above and below by the
area of the two rectangles.
As a simple application of the welfare bounds, let us consider the case of two markets
with linear demand curves,
x1 = a1 - biPi
x2 = a2 - b2P2.
For simplicity set marginal costs equal to zero. Then if the monopolist engages in price
discrimination, he will maximize revenue by selling halfway down each demand curve, so
that x1 = a1 /2 and x 2 = a2 /2.
Now suppose that the monopolist sells at a single price to both markets. The total
demand curve will be
+x2 = a1 +a 2 - (b1 +b 2 )p.
To maximize revenue the monopolist will operate halfway down the demand curve which
means that
a1i+a 2
Xj + X2 = 2
Hence with linear demand curves the total output is the same under price discrimination
as under ordinary monopoly. The bound given in (17) then implies that welfare must
decrease under price discrimination.
However, this result relies on the assumption that both rmarkets are served under the
ordinary monopoly. Suppose that market 2 is very small, so that the profit maximizing





Figure 2. An example where the monopolist chooses not to serve one of the markets.
In this case allowing price discrimination results in Ax1 = 0 and Ax2 > 0, providing
an unambiguous welfare gain by (17). Of course, this is not only a welfare gain, but is in
fact a Pareto improvement.
This example is quite robust. If a new market is opened up because of price discrim-
ination - a market that was not previously being served under the ordinary monopoly
- then we will typically have a Pareto improving welfare enhancement. This case is em-
phasized by Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1986) with respect to new patents. On the
other hand, if linearity of demand is not a bad first approximation, and output does not
change too drastically in response to price discrimination, we might well expect that the
net impact on welfare is negative.
Output Effect of Price Discrimination
Since the change in output provides some clue as to the welfare change, it is worthwhile
considering conditions under which it has a determinate sign. Robinson (1933), Battalio
and Ekelund (1972), Edwards (1950), Smith and Formby (1981), Finn (1974), Greenhut
and Ohta (1976), L6fgren (1971), Silberberg (1970), Schmalensee (1981) and others have
contributed to this question. For some general results and a good summary of the literature,
see Shih and Mai (1986).
We have seen above that a monopolist facing independent linear demands will produce
the same output under price discrimination as with uniform pricing. The next simplest
case is that where the demand curves are concave or convex.
Suppose for example that the demand function in market i is concave. Then we have
x,(p';) xj(p?) + x';(p?)[p'; - p?],
or
Ax, <z';(p0 )Ap,. (18)
Since x';(p?) < 0, since demand curves have a negative slope, the sign of Ax; can be
bounded by the sign of Ap;. Following Robinson, we call a market strong if Ap, > 0 and
weak if Ap; < 0. It follows from (18) that if all strong markets have concave demands and
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weak markets have linear demands, then total output must decline. Similarly, if all weak
markets have convex demands, and all strong markets have linear demands, total output
must increase under price discrimination.5
Intermediate Goods Markets
Katz (1987) has examined the welfare effect of price discrimination in intermediate goods
markets. This phenomenon is of some interest since the Robinson-Patman Act (discussed
below) was explicitly concerned with this form of price discrimination. There are two
important difference in the analysis of intermediate goods markets as compared to final
goods markets. The first is that the buyers' demands for the product are interdependent:
the profits and factor demands by a downstream firm depend on the factor demands of its
competitors. The second is that the buyers in intermediate goods markets often have the
possibility of integrating upstream and produce the intermediate good themselves.
The first effect means that the welfare analysis must take into account the induced
changes in the degree of competition engendered by different polices. The second effect
means that the welfare analysis must take into account inefficiencies in production decisions
caused by the different policies. Accordingly, there are two components to the change in
welfare when price discrimination is allowed in intermediate goods markets. The first is
the standard effect on the output of the final good which we have discussed above. The
second is the decision of whether or not to integrate and the resulting impact on the costs
of production.
These two components interact in complex ways. Katz shows that if there is no in-
tegration under either regime, total output and total welfare are both lower when price
discrimination is allowed than when it is forbidden. In fact, under reasonable conditions
price discrimination in intermediate goods markets can lead to higher prices being charged
to all buyers of the good, a result that cannot arise in final goods markets.
Katz shows that integration can only occur when price discrimination is banned, not
when it is allowed. If there is increasing returns in the intermediate good production, this
means that price discrimination may serve to prevent socially inefficient integration.
5. Defining the Market
In most of the literature on third-degree price discrimination, the determination of the
different groups of consumers is taken as exogenous to the model. The monopolist has
already decided to charge one price to people over 18 and another price to people under
18, or one price to customers who purchase drinks between 5 and 7 P.M. and another price
to those who purchase drinks at other hours. The only issue is what the prices should be.
However, it is clear that the choice of how to divide the market is a very important
consideration for the monopolist. In this section we will briefly examine this decision in a
highly specialized framework.
We will conduct our discussion in terms of pricing beverages by time-of-day, but a
variety of other interpretations are possible. We assume that the demand for drinks at
5 Note that Robinson, and several other subsequent authors, reverse the sense of concave and convex
when discussing these results.
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an arbitrary time t depends only on the time and the price charged at that time, so we
write x(pt, t). The assumption that demands are independent across the times of day is
admittedly a drastic simplification. We assume that 0 < t < 1.
Then if the monopolist charges pi before time T and P2 after time T, the total amount
that he sells in each time period will be given by
X1(pi, T) = x(pi, t) di
0I
X2 (P2, T) = Tx(p2 ,t) dt.
The profit maximization problem of the monopolist can then be written as
max (p1 - c)X 1(pi, T)+ (p 2 - c)X 2 (p2 , T).
P1,P2 ,T
The first-order conditions for this problem are
oX1
(Pi1- c) a + X1(p1, T) = 0
ap1
oX2
(P2 -c)ae+X 2 (p2 ,T) = 0
0P2
(P1 - c)x1(pi,T) - (P2 - c)x2 (P2, T) = 0.
The first two equations are the standard marginal revenue equals marginal cost condi-
tions. They can be transformed into the standard elasticity form and can be interpreted
in exactly the same way. Thus if the elasticity of demand increases with the time of day,
consumers after the breakpoint will pay a price lower than those before the breakpoint.
The third equation is new; it indicates how the monopolist determines the optimal
breakpoint. The interpretation of this condition is straightforward: when the monopolist
chooses the optimal breakpoint T, the profits earned from charging marginal consumer the
higher price must equal the profits earned from charging the lower price.
What about the welfare effects of the choice of breakpoint? Is the monopolist choosing
the correct breakpoint given his pricing decision? Or will there be a systematic distortion?
As it turns out there is a very general result available here: social welfare will always
increase by shifting the breakpoint in the direction of the lower prices. In our context of
pricing beverages by time-of-day we can refer to this as the Happy Hours Theorem: Happy
Hours are always too short.
The proof is easy. Consider moving the breakpoint a small aniount in the direction of
lower prices. This certainly makes the consumers better off. But since the breakpoint was
the profit maximizing choice by the monopolist, changing the breakpoint slightly must have
a zero first-order effect on profits. Hence, consumer pius producer surplus must necessarily
increase.
In the context of our independent demand example, if the elasticity of demand is
increasing with the time-of-day, then the monopolist always sets the breakpoint too early
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in the day, while the reverse is true if the elasticity of demand decreases with the time-of-
day.
Note that the Happy Hour Theorem itself does not rely on the assumption of indepen-
dent demands; it is true in complete generality. In other contexts it can be interpreted as
saying that airlines always have too severe requirements for the special fares, and that the
definition of Senior Citizens used by price discrimination firms is always too stringent.
6. Bundling
Bundling refers to the practice of selling two or more goods in a package. Pure bundling
means that the goods are only available in the package, while mixed bundling means that
the goods are available either individually or bundled together in a package. Examples of
bundling include prix fixe menus, mandatory service contracts, season tickets, and so on.
Mixed bundling includes such practices as roundtrip air fares, all inclusive vacation plans,
and different sizes of packaged goods.
The earliest reference to the phenomenon of bundling appears to be that of Burstein
(1960), followed by Stigler (1963). Adams and Yellen (1976) provide a clear discussion
with numerous examples.
Despite the prevalence of bundling as a marketing phenomenon, there is only a small
theoretical literature concerning this topic, probably due to the difficulty of getting analytic
results. Schmalensee (1984) conducts extensive numerical simulations to address some of
the questions surrounding the bundling literature. We will begin by summarizing the
framework of Adams and Yellen (1976).
The simplest case of bundling is that involving quantity bundling. Formally, this is a
case of second-degree price discrimination; i.e., nonlinear pricing. The simplest example
occurs when there are two types of consumers, a high-demand and a low-demand type,
but the firm cannot explicitly discriminate between the two types.
Suppose that the high-demand consumer is willing to pay $10 for one unit of the good
or $11 for two units, while the low-demand consumer is willing to pay $1 for one unit or
$2 for two units. Suppose for simplicity that marginal costs are zero. Then in this case an
effective strategy for the firm is to sell the good only in pairs, allowing the monopolist to
price discriminate between the high demand and low demand consumers. Here quantity
bundling serves as a way to satisfy the self-selection constraints and allows the monopolist
to engage in price discrimination.
Another example of bundling is discussed in Stigler (1963), who describes the common
practice of "block booking" movies. This practice required that theaters bought films in
packages, or bundles, rather than buying the individual films separately.
Suppose that there are two theaters, A and B. A is willing to pay $9,000 for film 1,
$3,000 for film 2, and $12,000 for the package. B is willing to pay $10,000 for film 1, $2,000
for film 2, and $12,000 for the package. Notice that the value of the bundle to each theater
is simply the sum of the values of the two films; there are no "interaction effects" in the
consumption of the two goods.
Suppose that costs are zero, so that the movie rental company is only interested in
maximizing revenue. If the rental company rents each film individually, profit maximization
requires that it rents film 1 for $9,000 and film 2 for $2,000 making a total of $11,000 from
24
each theater. But if it rents only the bundled package it makes $12,000 from each theater.
Effectively the rental company has managed to price discriminate between the two theaters;
it is renting film 1 to theater A for $9,000 and to firm B for $10,000, and similarly for
film 2.
This example illustrates an important point: bundling is most effective when there
is a negative correlation between the consumers' valuations of the goods. In the case
illustrated, theater A's value for film 1 is less than theater B's, but theater A's value for
film 2 is higher than theater B's.
Adams and Yellen (1976) present a series of useful diagrams to analyze the effects of
bundling. Consider a model in which each consumer wants at most one unit of each of two
goods, which are produced costlessly by a monopolist. The reservation prices of the two
goods will be denoted by r 1 and r2 . For simplicity, we suppose that each consumer's value
of the bundle is simply the sum of his or her reservation prices r 1 and r2 . Let f(ri, r2)
denote the density function for consumers who have reservation prices (ri, r2 ).
Figure 3a depicts the outcome under separate, nonbundled sales. The firm picks prices
(P1, P2), and sells to all consumers in the shaded area, N. Figure 3b shows the outcome of
pure bundling. The monopolist sells only the package at some price p, and all consumer




Figure 3. Illustration of non-bundled and bundled strategies.
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the effect of mixed bundling. Here we suppose that the
monopolist will sell the items separately at prices Pi and P2, or together in a bundle at
price pb. The areas ONLY1, ONLY2, and BOTH indicate the goods purchased by the
consumers with various combinations of reservation prices.
Adams and Yellen (1976) show using examples in this diagrammatic framework that
nearly anything can happen with bundling: bundling may be more or less profitable than
non-bundling, and consumers' surplus and total welfare may be higher or lower.
Since analytic results in the general model are so sparse, it is sensible to look for
plausible restrictions that yield results. For example, Schmalensee (1982) shows that if the
monopolist can only bundle its product~*ith another good that is competitively produced,




Figure 4. Illustration of mixed bundling strategy.
is a negative correlation among buyers' reservation prices, it may pay the monopolist to
engage in mixed bundling.
Adams and Yellen (1976) show that mixed bundling always dominates pure bundling.
McAfee, McMillan, and Winston (1987) have derived a condition on the distribution of
reservation price which guarantees that mixed bundling will dominate unbundled sales. In
particular, they show that if the buyers' reservation prices are independently distributed,
then mixed bundling will always dominate unbundled sales. Furthermore, when purchases
can be monitored, then bundling is preferred to unbundled sales for virtually all distribu-
tions of reservations prices.
Schmalensee (1984) describes a detailed set of simulations using Gaussian distributions
for the reservation prices of consumers. One of the most interesting results of Schmalensee's
simulations is the role played by the distribution of buyers' valuations of the two goods.
Intuition suggests that bundling is most effective when buyers' valuations are negatively
correlated - buyers who value good 1 highly place a small value on good 2 and vice versa.
However, Schmalensee suggests that the real role of bundling is to reduce the heterogeneity
of buyers' valuations. He demonstrates that, in the Gaussian case, the standard deviation
of the valuation of the bundles is always less than the sum of the standard deviations for the
individual components. By reducing the dispersion of buyers' valuations, the monopolist
is better able to extract the surplus from the population.
Although Schmalensee's imulations provide significant insight into bundling, it would
still be helpful to have some analytic results. One plausible research strategy is to examine
restrictions on preferences under which analytic results might be feasible. Suppose for
example, that we consider the case of the representative consumer - where the aggregate
demand behavior of the population behaves like that of a single representative consumer.
Let u(x 1, x2 )+y be the utility function of this representative consumer for goods x1 and
x2 , which may be bundled, and y, which represents all other goods. The inverse demand
2
26
functions for the two goods purchased separately are given by
Ou(x1 , x2)
8x1p1 (x1 7 1, x2)
p 2 (x1,x 2 ) =.u(x1 ,x 2 )
8x2
Suppose that the bundle consists of 1 unit of good 1 and k units of good 2 and that it sells
for a price of Pb. If we let x be the number of units of the bundle purchased, the utility
maximization problem of the representative consumer can be written as
max u(Xb, kXb)+y
Xb
s.t. pbxb + y = m.
Substituting from the constraint and differentiating, we see that the inverse demand func-
tion for the bundle is given by
b u(xb, kXb) Ou(xb,kxb)
pb(zb, kxb) = + k. (19)8x1 0x2
This equation says that the marginal willingness-to-pay for the bundle is simply sum of
the willingnesses-to-pay for the individual components, which is quite plausible.
Let the constant marginal costs of the two goods be c1 and c2 . The profit maximization
problem for the monopolist who sells the unbundled goods is
max (p1(x 1 , x2 )- c1)x1 + (p2(x1,x2) - c2)x2, (20)
Z1z,X2
while the profit maximization problem for the bundled monopolist is
max (pb(xb, kxb) - c1 - kc2 )xb. (21)
zb,k
We can now state our main result: in the context of the above model, the monopolist
can achieve exactly the same profits whether he bundles or not - there is no inherent
advantage to either strategy.
In order to prove this, simply substitute the expression for the inverse demand function
given in (19) into (21) and rearrange to get
max [p1(o., k.r) - C1]xb + [P2(x,rkxb) - c2 ]kzx . (22)
Comparing (20) and (22) we see that they describe exactly the same maximization problem:
for any pair (x*, x;) that yields a given profit level in (20) we can set x[ = xi and k = x/*
to achieve exactly the same profit level in (22), and vice versa. Hence, in the context of a
representative consumer model, bundling does no better than not bundling.
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Upon reflection this is not terribly surprising. Bundling is inherently a strategy that
exploits differences in willingness-to-pay across people, and bundling with a single con-
sumer - or an economy that acts like a single consumer - cannot be expected to be of
much interest. However, the representative consumer model can be used to generate some
other interesting questions. For example, for what distributions of willingness-to-pay does
the reservation price model of Adams and Yellen reduce to the representative consumer
model? The answer to this question would give us more of handle on determining for what
distributions bundling is profitable. Will mixed bundling generally dominate separate sales
in the reservation price model? Since mixed bundling dominates pure bundling, one being
a special case of the other, we expect that the answer to this question is yes.
Applications
As we saw in the introductory remarks, price discrimination is a very commonly used
marketing tactic. In the following sections, we will discuss a number of ways that firms
can use to price discriminate among their customers.
7. Spatial Price Discrimination
Firms often use delivery charges - or the absence of delivery charges - to price discrim-
inate among customers. For example, cement in Belgium is sold at a uniform delivered
price throughout the country; while plasterboard is sold at a uniform delivered price in
the UK. See Phlips (1983), pp. 23-30 for a detailed discussion of such pricing policies in
Europe.
Even though delivery costs of these goods can be a significant fraction of their value,
firm may find it profitable to charge one price for all areas. In many cases, FOB pricing -
in which the customers provide the transportation and pays one price for "freight on board"
at a central warehouse - is explicitly excluded by the providers of the good. Instead, the
producers offer only a price which includes delivery charges.
In order to model the effect of transportation costs on the monopolist's pricing policy,
suppose that the inverse demand function for the delivered good is denoted by p(x) and that
the total transportation costs are denoted by tx. Thus the net demand function facing the
firm is then p(x) - t. Assuming constant marginal costs, the profit maximization problem
for the firm becomes
max [p(x) - t - c]x,
which has the standard first order conditions
p(x)+p'(x)x = c+t. (23)
How will the net price to the consumer change as the transportation costs change? The
above formulation makes it clear that this is the same as asking how the price to consumers
changes as we change an excise tax on a monopolist.
Implicitly differentiating (23) with respect to t and solving for dx/dt, wc have
dx 1





Thus the amount of the transportation costs that are passed along depends on the
second derivative of the inverse demand function, p"(x). We can examine a few special
cases. If the inverse demand curve is linear, p"(x) = 0 and therefore half of the trans-
portation costs will be paid by the consumers. In this case the monopolist practices freight
absorption and discriminates against customers with lower transport costs. This is similar
to the examples of cement and plasterboard described above: the firm effectively absorbs
part or all of the transportation costs.
If the inverse demand curve has a constant elasticity of e, then the monopolist charges
a constant markup on marginal cost, so that the customers at each distance will effectively
pay more for delivery than the actual delivery costs. However, this form of price discrimi-
nation is especially sensitive to consumer arbitrage - consumers with lower transportation
costs can transship to those with higher transportation costs, essentially undermining the
monopolist's position.
Delivered pricing systems have sometimes been attacked as anticompetitive under the
Robinson-Patman Act; for a discussion of some of the issues involved and citations to a
number of relevant cases, see Neale and Goyder (1980), pages 245-248.
8. Intertemporal Discrimination
Often new products are introduced at a high price which later declines. For example
books are typically introduced in expensive hardcover editions and only later published
as less expensive paperbacks. Such a policy appears to be a form of intertemporal price
discrimination: the monopolist attempts to first extract the surplus from the high-demand
consumers and only later sells to the low-demand consumers.
This kind of intertemporal price discrimination was first analyzed in detail by Stokey
(1979). She considered a model with a continuum of consumers and times in which the
consumers and the firm have the, same discount rate. In the context of this model, Stokey
proved a very surprising result: the profit-maximizing policy of the firm is to charge a
uniform price, not to engage in price discrimination.
We will investigate Stokey's result in the context of a much simpler model based on the
discussion in Section 5 concerning self-selection constraints. Suppose that there are two
consumers with reservation prices r 1 and r2 and a common discount factor of 0 < a < 1.
Without loss of generality, suppose that r 1 > r2. The monopolist, who also has a discount
rate of a, can costlessly supply up to two units of the good.
We now consider whether it is optimal to price discriminate in this model. Suppose
that the monopolist sets prices Pi and P2 that succeed in inducing consumer 1 to consume
in the first period and consumer 2 to consume in the second period. Then each consumer
must prefer the discounted net value of his purchase to that of the other consumer; this
gives us the self-selection constraints
r1 -i p1 a(r1 -P2) (24)
a(r2 - p2) r2 - p1. (25)
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The first inequality says that the period 1 purchaser prefers his choice to buying in period
2, while the second inequality states the analogous condition for consumer 2. If we multiply
these two inequalities together and cancel the a from each side, we have
(r1 - p 1 )(r 2 -p2) > (r 1 - p2 )(r 2 - p1).
After some manipulation, this inequality becomes
(P2 - p1)(r2 - r1 ) 2>0.
Since r 1 > r2 by assumption, we must have p1 p2, which simply means that the price in
the first period must be higher than the price in the second, hardly a surprising result.
The problem faced by the price discriminating monopolist can now be written as
max p1 + ap2
P1,P2
s.t. r 1 - pi a(r1 P2) (26)
a(r 2 -p2) r2 -P1 (27)
r1 2 p1 (28)
r2 > P2 (29)
Although there are four constraints in this linear program, they are not all independent.
Rearranging (26) we have
1
r 1 > (p1 - ap 1).1-a
Subtracting p1 from each side gives
1




It follows that (26) implies (28), so we drop (28) from the set of constraints.
At the solution to this linear programming problem, at least two of the constraints will
be binding. Eliminating the trivial cases, this leaves us with three possibilities.
Case 1. r - P1 = a(r1 - P2) and a(r 2 - P2) = r2 - p1. Manipulating these inequalities
gives us (1 - a)r1 = pi - ap2 = (1 - a>r2 , a contradiction.
Case 2. r2 = p2 and a(r 2 - P2) = r2- p1. These two equations imply that Pi = P2, so
uniform pricing is optimal.
Case 3. r2 = P2 and r1 - Pi = a(r1 - p2). Solving for pi and substituting into the profit
function shows that the profits of the firm are
i= r1 + a(2r2 - r1). (30)
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If these are the maximum profits the firm can make, they must dominate the policy of
selling only in period 1 at a price of either r1 and only satisfying the high-demand customers
or selling at r 2 and satisfying both customers. Hence we must satisfy the following two
inequalities.
r1 + a(2r2 - ri) r 1
r 1 + a(2r2 - ri) 2r2-
However it is easily checked that these inequalities imply r1 = 2r2 . Substituting back
into the profit function (30) we find that ir = r1 = 2r2 , so that the profits from price
discrimination are equal to those from uniform pricing.
In summary, the optimal policy of the firm either involves charging a constant price in
each period or selling at a price of r1 or r2 in the first period, and not selling at all in the
second period. Neither alternative involves intertemporal price discrimination.
Salant (1987) asks why this extreme solution arises in the case of intertemporal price
discrimination, but not in the general case of nonlinear pricing. He points out that the
general analysis of nonlinear pricing typically assumes appropriately curved objective func-
tions and constraints and limits itself to examining only interior solutions. In the intertem-
poral case, linearity of the objective function and constraints is a very natural assumption,
and we should not be surprised that boundary solutions may be optimal.
However, the result that intertemporal price discrimination is not profit maximizing is
a disturbing one, since firms seem to engage in such behavior. There are several ways to
relax the assumptions of the model to allow for intertemporal price discrimination. For
example, if the discount rates differ across consumers, price discrimination can easily be
optimal. Similarly, if the discount rates of the consumers differ from that of the monopolist,
price discrimination may be optimal.
It is easy to see when this may occur in our model. The only case involving the profit
function of the firm is case 3. Letting #3 be the discount factor of the monopolist, a sufficient
condition for price discrimination to be optimal is that the discounted profits from price
discrimination dominate selling only in the first period:
(1 - a)r1 + (a + 3)r2 > max{ri, 2r2 }.
It follows that intertemporal price discrimination can be optimal only when 3 > a, i.e.,
when the monopolist is less impatient than the consumers. Landsberger and Meilijson
(1985) examine the profitability of price discrimination when discount rates differ and
derive a similar condition using Stokey's original continuous-time formulation.
We have also assumed that the good was costlessly produced. It is trivial to generalize
our argument to the case of constant marginal costs, but if marginal costs are increasing
the argument may fail. In the case of increasing marginal costs, it may be profitable to
spread out the sales over time so as to keep production costs down.
One assumption implicit in our analysis is that the firm can credibly precommit to
charging a constant price every period. To see that this can be a problem, let us consider
the case where it is profitable to serve only the first-period consumers. In this case the
prices are set at p1 = p2 = ri, but no consumers purchase in the second period.
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However, once the monopolist has satisfied the needs of the high-demand, first-period
consumers, he is left with only the low-demand consumers. In this subgame, the optimal
policy of the monopolist is to charge the low-demand consumers their reservation price r2
in the second period. But the first-period consumers should be able to realize that the
monopolist will charge this lower price second period - and therefore refuse to purchase
in the first period!
The problem is that the solution of charging a constant price each period is not subgame
perfect - the behavior of the monopolist is not optimal for each subgame in which he
may find himself. Without the ability to precommit to the constant price schedule, the
monopolist may be unable to enforce the constant-price, no-discrimination solution.
In our model, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is to charge p1 = r2 and sell to
both groups of consumers in the first period, regardless of the size of the two groups of
consumers. Any policy in which firm sells only to the high-demand consumers is not
credible in that the firm will always be tempted to sell at a lower price later on. Note that
this result follows no matter how small r2 is, or no matter how many period or groups of
consumers are involved. The inability to precommit has essentially eroded the monopoly
power of the firm!
This possibility was first pointed out by Coase (1972). He argued that as long as
there were no constraints on the rate of sales, all units of the good would be sold in the
first period at marginal cost. (Coase implicitly assumed that there were consumers with
arbitrarily low reservation prices, so that the price would be pushed as low as possible. In
our model, the price is pushed down to the lowest reservation price.)
This "Coase conjecture" has been analyzed formally by Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982),
Kahn (1986), and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986). The analysis is somewhat del-
icate, as it depends on a sensitive limiting argument about how often the monopolist is
allowed to adjust prices. Stokey (1981) shows that if the monopolist can only adjust prices
at discrete points in time, then the further apart these points are, the higher are the
monopoly profits. Essentially the requirement that prices can only be adjusted at discrete
times makes it credible that the monopolist will charge a particular price at least until the
next opportunity to adjust it. This tends to make the precommitment constraint on the
monopolist less binding, and therefore leads to higher profits.
9. Vertical Integration and Price Discrimination
To understand how vertical integration can help enforce price discrimination, let us consider
a model where a producer of a primary product, such as aluminum, sells to two competitive
industries that produce distinct final goods. To take an extreme case, suppose that each of
the final goods producers uses one unit of the input to produce one unit of their output. Let
p1(x1) and P2 (x 2 ) be the inverse demand functions for the outputs of the two industries;
for simplicity suppose that these demand functions have constant elasticities of ei and e2,
respectively.
In this case, it is easy to see that it will typically pay the producer of the primary
product to price discriminate in its provision to the two industries. Effectively the primary
producer controls the output in each industry and will set the price of the primary product
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to maximize its profits. This leads to the conventional solution
P11 - - =-c
p* 1 - - c.
This solution is only viable if the monopolist is able to prevent arbitrage. If the indus-
try that receives the lower price can resell to the high price industry, the monopolist's price
discrimination policy cannot be implemented. However, there is a strategy that can ac-
complish much the same thing. Suppose that industry 2 has the larger elasticity of demand
and therefore the lower price. Then the monopolist can integrate forward by operating a
firm in industry 2, selling its output at price p; and sell the rest of the primary product
at a uniform higher price of p*.
In this case the firms in industry 1 will still be willing to pay the higher price, but the
firms in industry 2 will be squeezed by the monopolist's transfer pricing to its subsidiary. If
nothing, is done, the firms in industry 2 will be driven out of business, and the monopolist
will be able to enforce the price discrimination outcome through the vertical integration
mechanism.
There have been a number of attempts to address the problem of how to detect subsi-
dized transfer pricing of this sort. See Perry (1978), (1980), (1988) and Joskow (1985) for
a more detailed discussion of price discrimination as a motive for vertical integration.
10. Imperfect Information
There are conflicting intuitions about the effect of imperfect information in monopolized
markets. On the one hand, search activities by consumers represent a price paid by con-
sumers that is not captured by the firm, so it is in the interest of the firm to "internalize"
that cost by eliminating price dispersion. On the other hand, if consumers differ in their
costs of search, price dispersion may be an effective means of sorting consumers and di-
viding the market, thereby allow for price discrimination in equilibrium.
Sorting consumers based on the basis of their cost of search is especially convenient
since it is natural to suppose that consumers who are well informed about prices being
offered elsewhere have more elastic demands than consumers who are poorly informed. Or,
more generally, consumers with low costs of search will have more elastic demands than
consumers with high costs of search. This observation suggests that it may be profitable
for stores to use "noisy prices" as a selection device to discriminate among consumers.
This phenomenon was first examined by Salop (1977) and later extended by Bern-
inghaus and Ramser (1980) and Wiesmeth (1982). In Salop's model there is a single
monopolist with several outlets; the consumers know the distribution of prices charged at
the various outlets, but do not know precisely which stores charge which prices. Hence
they engage in costly search before purchasing the good. Consumers have different search
costs and different reservation prices for the good. Salop (1977) and Wiesmeth (1982) show
that, under certain assumptions about the joint distribution of search costs and reservation
prices, the monopolist can use price dispersion to sort consumers in a way that increases
his profits.
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Sorting by information costs is an important idea, but the particular case examined
by Salop does not seem terribly plausible. Casual empiricism suggests that chain stores,
such as McDonald's, typically try to charge uniform prices across their outlets rather than
randomizing their prices. It seems that the first intuition- that of minimizing consumer
search costs - is a more important consideration for chain stores and franchises than price
discrimination.
However, instead of price dispersion across space, we can consider price discrimination
across time. Suppose we consider a model where there are several imperfectly competitive
firms, each with one outlet, that randomly charges different prices in different weeks. By
randomizing their prices, the stores are able to compete for the price-sensitive consumers
when their prices are low, but still charge high prices to price-insensitive consumers on the
average. One can interpret this behavior as stores engaging in random sales. Varian (1981)
has constructed a formal model of this behavior to determine the equilibrium pattern of
sales. Here we briefly consider Varian's model.
Suppose that there are n stores selling an identical product which have identical, strictly
decreasing average cost curves. Each store chooses the frequency f(p) with which it ad-
vertises each price. Some fraction of the consumers read the ads and learn the entire
distribution of prices; they therefore only shop at the lowest price store. The rest of the
consumers shop at random. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the good.
We seek to characterize a symmetric Nash equilibrium in this model. The first ob-
servation is that since average costs are always declining, there can be no pure strategy
equilibrium in which all firms charge a single price. The only possible equilibrium therefore
involves a mixed strategy.
It turns out that one can show that the equilibrium frequency distribution must be
atomless - that is, there can be no prices that are charged with strictly positive probability.
The intuition is not difficult: suppose that there were such an atom-some price that all
stores charged with positive probability. Then there would be a positive probability of a tie
at such a price, so some number of stores would split the informed consumers. By choosing
a frequency distribution that charged a slightly lower price with positive probability, a store
would capture the entire market of informed consumers in the event that the other stores
tied, and only make slightly smaller profits in the other events. Hence, charging one price
with positive probability can not be a profit-maximizing symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Given this observation, it is not difficult to calculate the expected profits of a firm. If
F(p) is the equilibrium price distribution function then exactly two events are relevant.
Either the firm in question is charging the lowest price, an event which happens with
probability (1 - F(p))"1, or it does not have the lowest price, an event which has the
complementary probability. If it has the lowest price, it gets I + U customers, where I is
the total number of informed customers and U is the number of uninforrmed customers per
store.
Suppose for simplicity that the firm has constant marginal costs of zero and fixed costs
of k. Then the expected profits of a representative firm are
=r  {(1 - F(p))" 1 [pI +pU - k] + [1 -(1 - F(p))"-1 ][pU - k]} f(p) dp.
If the store is choosing the optimal density function f(-), then the integrand must be
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constant - if expected profits were higher at some price than at some other price, it would
pay the store to charge the more profitable price more frequently. Assuming free entry,
this constant level of profits must be zero. This gives us the equilibrium condition
(1 - F(p))"- [pI + pU - k] + [1 -(1 - F(p))"~1][pU - k| = 0.
Solving for F(p) gives us




This distribution function is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium pricing pattern in this
model. The associated density function, f(p), is simply the derivative of this distribution
function.
Rather than having the normal bell shape that we expect from a probability distribu-
tion, the equilibrium density f(p) has a U-shape - that is, each store charges high and low
prices more often than intermediate prices. This seems quite intuitive: a store wants to
charge high prices to exploit the uninformed and low prices to compete for the informed.
Intermediate prices serve neither goal and so are charged less frequently. However, they
are still charged sometimes, since if no one ever charged an intermediate price, it would
pay some store to do so.
For more on sales and related marketing techniques, see Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel
(1984), Sobel (1984), Gerstner (1985), Png and Hirschleifer (1986), and Raju (1986).
11. Quality Differences
It has long been recognized that a monopolist may use quality differences to discriminate
among consumers. Witness, for example, Dupuit's insightful remarks:
It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to
put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third-class seats that
some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches ... What the
company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second class
fare from traveling third-class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them,
but to frighten the rich ... And it is again for the same reason that the companies,
having proved almost cruel to third-class passengers and mean to second-class ones,
become lavish in dealing with first-class passengers. Having refused the poor what
is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous. Quoted by Ekelund (1970).
This passage clearly states the considerations facing the monopolist: by exaggerating
the quality difference in the classes of service, he can effectively price discriminate between
customers with different willingnesses-to-pay for the basic transportation service.
This phenomenon has been modeled by Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley
(1984) and several others. At a formal level quality difference can be analyzed using
techniques of nonlinear pricing. For example, consider the model of nonlinear pricing
described in Section 3. In this model we used u(x, t) to represent the utility of a consumer
of type t who consumed a quantity x of the good in question, and used c(x) to denote
the cost of producing the quantity x. The pricing function, r(-), measured the cost of
purchasing a quantity x.
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But suppose instead we let x be the quality of a good, c(x) the cost of producing it,
and r(x) the price of purchasing one unit of quality level x. Given these substitutions,
the quantity-pricing problem considered in Section 5 is isomorphic to the quality-pricing
problem of a monopolist. All of the analysis and results go through virtually unchanged.
The fundamental constraint in the quality-pricing problem is the same as that in the
quantity-pricing, namely the self-selection constraint: choosing a pricing scheme that in-
duces consumers of each quality level to prefer their own quality to any other quality. This
is the emphasis of the Dupuit passage quoted above: the nature of the quality choices made
are exaggerated so as to satisfy the self-selection constraints. We would generally expect
that the monopolist would widen the quality choice spectrum in order to more effectively
discriminate among the consumers it faces.
The major result of the nonlinear pricing model is that the largest consumer faces a
price equal to marginal cost; here the analogous result is that the monopolist sells the
highest quality item at its marginal cost of production. Purchasers of lower quality items
in general pay more than the marginal cost of the quality they choose. For more on quality
choice see Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984), Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton
and Thisse (1986), and Oren, Smith and Wilson (1982).
12. Monopolistic Competition
Although we generally describe price discrimination in terms of pure monopoly behavior,
many of the most common real life examples of price discrimination occur in markets
with free entry. For example, magazine subscriptions and movies are sold at student
discounts; drug stores provide Senior Citizen discounts; and airlines sell trips for different
durations at different prices. Certainly none of these industries could be thought of as pure
monopolies. Instead they would probably be characterized by the presence of significant
product differentiation and by the availability of relatively free entry and zero long-run
profits. In short, most economists would think of these industries as monopolistically
competitive.
Of course, the effects we have described in the pure monopoly context are still relevant
in a monopolistically competitive environment. We have taken the demand curve facing
the monopolist as exogenously given. In equilibrium the demand facing a particular firm
depends on the other firms' behavior, but under the common Nash-Cournot assumption,
each firm will take those other firms actions as given. Insofar as we only wish to describe
a single firm's behavior, the previous discussion has been adequate.
However, when we turn our attention to a model with multiple firms, several new effects
can arise. In particular, we can ask how price discrimination tends to affect the number
of firms in equilibrium and the variety of products they offer. Does price discrimination
tend to increase or decrease welfare in a monopolistically competitive environment? What
is the miost effective form of discrimination when there are heterogeneous products?
There have been a few attempts to address these questions in a mnonopolistically coml-
Ipetitive framework. In general the authors have taken one of the standard models of
monopolistic competition, allowed the firms to price discriminate, and then investigated
the effect of this price discrimination on the equilibrium behavior of the firms.
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Katz (1984) applied such a research strategy using the Salop and Stiglitz (1977) "bar-
gains and ripoffs" model. In this model, there are two types of consumers, the informed
and uninformed. The informed consumers know the prices charged by all stores and the
uninformed know none of the prices being charged. Each type of consumer has a reser-
vation price, L-shaped demand, but the informed consumers wish to purchase a larger
amount than the uninformed.
In the Salop and Stiglitz model, in which stores could only charge a uniform price,
there could exist equilibria involving price dispersion. They showed that for some param-
eter configurations, there would be exactly two prices charged in equilibrium: low-price
stores competed for the informed consumers and high-price stores exploited the uninformed
consumers.
Katz (1984) asked what would happen if the stores were allowed to price discriminate.
He showed that in this case there would exist a unique, symmetric equilibrium where all
stores charged the same price schedule. The price schedule exhibits quantity discounting
and thereby allows the stores to discriminate between the high-demand, informed con-
sumers and the low-demand uninformed consumers.
In the equilibrium involving price discrimination, the price paid by the informed con-
sumers is lower and the price paid by the uninformed consumers is higher than in the
uniform pricing equilibrium. There are more firms in the price discrimination equilibrium
than the uniform pricing equilibrium. If uninformed consumers are a small part of the
market, then uniform pricing is better in terms of total surplus, but this result is reversed
if the uninformed consumers dominate the market.
Borenstein (1985) has investigated a different set of issues in the context of the location
model of Lerner and Singer (1937) and Salop (1979). Here the emphasis is much more
on the product heterogeneity aspect of price discrimination and on the form that price
discrimination can take in such an environment.
In the classic monopolistically competitive location model described by Lerner and
Singer (1937), consumers are located around a circle. Each consumer's location indicates
his most preferred brand preference, and each consumer faces some travel cost if he con-
sumes a more distant brand. In most treatments of this model, consumers have identical
reservation prices and travel costs; Borenstein (1985) relaxes this assumption and allows
consumers to differ in both characteristics. Differences in reservation price are interpreted
as the usual differences in tastes; differences in travel costs are interpreted as the strength
of brand preference.
Borenstein assumes that firms observe some characteristic of consumers that allows
them to sort on one or the other of these two dimensions, and charge different prices
accordingly. He uses numerical simulation to determine the effectiveness of the two forms
of price discrimination. Borenstein finds that the effectiveness of the two forms of price
discrimination depends on the type of equilibrium exhibited by the model.
If the monopolistically competitive equilibrium is highly competitive, with firms packed
close together in the product space, then sorting by reservation price doesn't have much ef-
fect on the total size of the market - consumers simply switch from one brand to another.
In this case, price discrimination on the basis of reservation price simply redistributes con-
sumers from one brand to another and does little in the way of enhancing total sales or
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overall welfare. In this sort of equilibrium sorting on the base of strength of brand pref-
erence is the more effective form of price discrimination yielding larger price differentials,
larger profits in the short run and more firms in the long run equilibrium.
On the other hand, if the monopolistically competitive equilibrium is more "monopo-
lized" than "competitive," the strength of preference criterion is not as effective a means of
sorting consumers as is the standard reservation price method. This equilibrium is much
like the standard story of monopoly price discrimination: output and welfare can either
increase or decrease under discrimination as compared with uniform pricing. However,
Borenstein shows that in this case welfare is more likely to increase when price discrimina-
tion is allowed than in the standard monopoly case. This follows from free entry: allowing
price discrimination will increase the profits of the existing firms and thereby induce entry.
But with more firms in the market, the market will be more competitive which will be
better for the consumers.
The Katz model and the Borenstein model emphasize different aspects of price discrimi-
nation under monopolistic competition: Katz is really concerned with the equilibrium form
of the optimal second-degree price discrimination rule, while Borenstein is concerned with
the sorting criterion involved with using third-degree price discrimination. The questions
they investigate are similar, however: how does this new dimension affect the industry
performance in a monopolistically competitive environment? It appears that there are a
variety of other models of monopolistic competition that could benefit from similar anal-
yses.
13. Legal Aspects of Price Discrimination
Price discrimination has long been regarded as a dubious practice from the legal viewpoint,
though the complaints about the practice voiced by legislators are typically not those voiced
by economists. In this section we will briefly review the history and current legal thought
on price discrimination. The major source for this material, and an excellent guide to
antitrust law in general, is Neale and Goyder (1980).
The Clayton Act of 1914 was the first attempt to make price discrimination illegal. The
intent of Congress appeared to have been to restrict the practice of "predatory pricing"
rather than to restrict price discrimination per se. The focus of the law involved situations
where a supplier provided a good to retailers in one region at a price below cost in order
to drive out the competition; the law was intended to protect small businesses from such
competition, not to protect the end customers.
The law recognized that not every difference in pricing should be construed as price
discrimination, but the attempts to define exactly what was and was not legal were not
very successful. The original section 2 of the Clayton Act read:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discrim-
inate in price between different purchasers of commodities ... where the effect of
such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
monopoly in any line of commerce; Provided, that nothing herein contained shall
prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of comnmodities on account of
differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes
only due allowance for differences in the cost of selling or transportation, or discrim-
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ination in price in the same or different commodities made in good faith to meet
competition ....
The astute reader of this survey will note that the proviso allows for many of the
forms of price discrimination we have discussed. The ambiguity of the definition of price
(liscrimination resulted in very few cases being successfully brought to trial under this
section.
In the early thirties the spread of chain stores, in particular groceries, brought pres-
sure to bear for strengthening the law against price discrimination, and in 1936 Congress
passed the Robinson-Patman Act. As with the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act
was primarily designed to protect the small independent from the large chain, rather than
to protect the end users. However, the Robinson-Patman Act had a different focus. Rather
than focusing on the powerful supplier who used local price cutting to drive out competi-
tors, the Act was designed to control the large, powerful buyers who could use their size
to negotiate more favorable terms than their competition.
Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act goes as follows:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
tion with any person who either grants or knowvingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
As Neale and Goyder (1980) put it:
The Robinson-Patman revision of section 2 of the Clayton Act, whatever its
other failing, has at least given rise to plenty of cases; but since many of these have
been disposed of by consent order and other informal processes, the legal principles
now regarded as applicable have been established in relatively few litigated cases.
(p. 215)
Given the focus of the law on protecting small businesses from large chains, it is not sur-
prising that many of the first cases brought to trial under the Robinson-Patman Act were
cases of second degree price discrimination - i.e., nonlinear pricing. A notable example
was the Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt (Supreme Court, 1948). Morton Salt
charged different prices for different quantities of table salt; the discounts ranged up to 15
percent, but only five large chain stores had ever qualified for this magnitude of discount.
It was claimed that this form of price discrimination injured competition at the retail store
level. Much of the judicial debate centered on the issue of whether the magnitude of the
discounts was substantial enough to create serious injury to competition.
In other cases, such as A merican Can Company v. Bruce's Juices the debate was cen-
tered on the issue of whether the cost reductions associated with larger customers justified
the price differences charged. In this case, it was found that discounted schedule was
"tainted with the inherent vice of too broad averaging" since 98 percent of the customers
involved failed to qualify for the discounts offered. However, the A merican Can Company
v. Russ elville Canning (1951) the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a pricing
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schedule did not have to be precisely related to costs at each level of sales, but only needed
to have been adopted in good faith after some reasonable study of costs.
The other main line of defense against the Robinson-Patman Act is that the low prices
were charged only to meet "in good faith" the prices charged by the competition. Stan-
dard Oil Company (Indiana) v. Federal Trade Commission (Supreme Court, 1951) is an
important case in point. Standard Oil sold gasoline to larger jobbers who supplied their
own stations at prices of 1} cents per gallon less than the prices at which Standard directly
supplied individual retailers. The Federal Trade Commission argued that this differential
resulted in "injuring, destroying and preventing competition between said favored dealers
and retailer dealers."
Standard first attempted to show that the difference in price could be accounted for
by differences in costs of supply, but this defense was not successful. The second line of
defense was to show that other refiners were attempting to get the business of the four large
jobbers by offering them equally low prices. Although rejected by the FTC, this defense
was accepted by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the Supreme Court has attempted to
clarify exactly what evidence should be brought to bear in adopting a defense of meeting
the competitors' prices. See Neale and Goyder, pages 224-228.
Essentially, the burden of proof should be on the alleged price discriminator to show
that it was meeting lawful prices of its competition, rather than simply copying the pricing
strategy of other discriminators. However, subsequent cases have weakened the nature of
the proof required in these cases: typically the defense of meeting the competition is only
required to "embody the standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to what he
reasonably believes is a situation of cormpetitive necessity." Continental Banking Company
(1963).
Economic Aspects of Robinson-Patman Act
In reading the legal discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act, one is struck by the difference
between the legal concerns and the concerns of economists. The legal issues surrounding the
issue of price discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act are those of unfair competition,
predatory pricing, and the like. The issues of concern to economists are those of efficient
pricing.
As we saw in the discussion of the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination,
we can expect that allowing price discrimination will typically enhance welfare if it provides
a means of serving markets that the monopolist would otherwise not serve. Conversely, if
the size of the market does not increase under price discrimination, there can be no net
increase in consumers' plus producers' surplus. Thus, it would seem that an economically
sound discussion of whether price discrimination is in the social interest should focus on
the output effects. However, as we've seen above, this consideration has not played much
of a role in the legal discussion of price discrimination.
14. Summary
As we indicated at the beginning of this paper, price discrimination is a ubiquitous phe-
nomenon. Nearly all firms with market power attempt to engage in some type of price
discrimination. Thus the analysis of the forms that price discrimination can take and the
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effects of price discrimination on economic welfare are a very important aspect of the study
of industrial organization.
In this survey we have seen some of the insights offered by the economic theory of
price discrimination. However, much work remains to be done. For example, the study
of marketing behavior at the retail level is still in its infancy. Retail firms use a variety
of marketing devices - sales, coupons, matching offers, price promotions, and so on -
that apparently enhance sales. The marketing literature has examined individual firm
choices of such promotional tools. But what is the ultimate effect of such promotions on
the structure and performance of market equilibrium? What kinds of marketing devices
serve to enhance economic welfare and what kinds represent deadweight loss?
One particularly interesting set of questions in this area that has received little atten-
tion concerns the computational costs involved in using complex forms of price discrimi-
nation. In the post-deregulation airline industry of the U.S., airlines have taken to using
very involved pricing schemes. Finding the most inexpensive feasible flight may involve
a considerable expenditure of time and effort. What are the welfare consequences of this
sort of price discrimination? Do firms appropriately take into account the computational
externality imposed on their customers?
Even in more prosaic case of public utilities,.pricing schedules have become so complex
that households often make the "wrong" choice of telephone service or electricity use.
Questions of simplicity and ease-of-use have not hitherto played a role in the positive and
normative analysis of price discrimination. Perhaps this will serve as a fruitful area of
investigation in future studies of price discrimination.
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